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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-JURY SELECTION-PEREMPTORY CHAL-
LENGES--The United States Supreme Court held that intention-
al gender discrimination by state actors when exercising pe-
remptory challenges in the jury selection process violates the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419 (1994).
A complaint for paternity and child support was filed by the
State of Alabama (the "State") on behalf of T.B., the mother of a
minor child, against petitioner J.E.B. (the "Petitioner") in the
District Court of Jackson County, Alabama.1 A pool of thirty-six
potential jurors was available when the matter came to trial,
three of whom were subsequently excused for cause.2 Of the
remaining pool of jurors, ten were male and twenty-three were
female.3 In accordance with the Alabama Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, a struck-jury system was employed to obtain twelve ju-
rors.' The State used nine of its ten peremptory challenges5 to
remove male jurors and the Petitioner used all but one of his
challenges to remove female jurors, resulting in a jury composed
of twelve women.'
Before the jury was impaneled, the Petitioner objected to the
State's use of its peremptory challenges, claiming that the chal-
lenges violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment7 because they were based solely on the gender of
1. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1421 (1994).
2. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1421.
3. Id. at 1422.
4. Id. at 1425 n.17. The Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure provide that,
"[riegular jurors shall be selected from a list containing the names of at least twen-
ty-four competent jurors and shall be obtained by the parties or their attorneys
alternately striking one from the list until twelve remain, the party demanding the
jury commencing." ALA. R. Civ. P. 47.
5. A peremptory challenge is the right to challenge a juror without assigning,
or being required to assign, a reason for the challenge. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY
1136 (6th ed. 1990).
6. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1422.
7. Id. The Fourteenth Amendment provides:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
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the prospective juror.8 The Petitioner argued that the holding in
Batson v. Kentucky,9 which prohibited peremptory strikes made
solely on the basis of race, should be extended to include gender-
based challenges as well.'0 The district court rejected this claim
and impaneled the all-female jury." On a post-judgment mo-
tion, the court reaffirmed its earlier ruling that Batson did not
extend to gender-based peremptory challenges. 2 The Petitioner
appealed to the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals, which affirmed
the ruling of the lower court.'3 The Petitioner's appeal to the
Supreme Court of Alabama was denied.' He then petitioned to
the United States Supreme Court, which granted certiorari in
order to resolve the conflict of authority that existed on the issue
of gender-based peremptory challenges."
The Supreme Court concluded that the Equal Protection
Clause prohibited a state actor 6 from intentionally discriminat-
ing in jury selection on the basis of gender, or on the assumption
that an individual would be biased in a particular case solely
because that person was a man or a woman. 7 With Justice
Blackmun writing for the majority,8 the Court initially deter-
mined that the rationale underlying its decision in Batson ap-
plied with equal force to discrimination based on sex." The
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
8. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1422.
9. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
10. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1422.
11. Id. The jury subsequently found the Petitioner to be the father of the
child. Id.
12. Id.
13. J.E.B. v. State, 606 So.2d 156, 157 (Ala. Civ. App. 1992), rev'd, 114 S. Ct.
1419 (1994). Relying strictly on Alabama precedent, the appellate court merely noted
that the issue had been previously decided by the. Alabama Court of Criminal Ap-
peals and the Alabama Supreme Court. Id. (citing Fisher v. State, 587 So.2d 1027
(Ala. Crim. App. 1991) and Ex parte Murphy, 596 So.2d 45 (Ala. 1992)). However, it
did not reiterate any of the reasons given in those cases or attempt to reinforce
them in any way. See J.E.B., 606 So.2d at 157.
14. Ex parte J.E.B, No. 1911717 (Ala. Oct. 23, 1992).
15. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1422; see J.E.B. v. T.B., 113 S. Ct. 2330 (1993)
(granting certiorari). The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit had
extended Batson to prohibit gender-based peremptory challenges. See United States
v. DeGross, 960 F.2d 1433 (9th Cir. 1992) (en banc). However, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit declined to extend Batson to gender-based
challenges. See United States v. Nichols, 937 F.2d 1257 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 989 (1992).
16. For purposes of peremptory challenges, a state actor includes a private
civil litigant as well as a criminal defendant. See Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct.
2348 (1992); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991).
17. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1430.
18. Id. at 1421. Justice Blackmun was joined in his opinion by Justices
Stevens, O'Connor, Souter, and Ginsburg. Id.
19. Id.
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State sought to distinguish Batson by arguing that gender dis-
crimination was not as pervasive as racial discrimination and
that the same standards should not be applied.20 This logic was
rejected by the Court, citing a long history of gender discrimina-
tion with regard to jury service.21 However, the Court asserted
that such a showing was not necessary, and reiterated that all
gender-based classifications warranted heightened scrutiny un-
der the Equal Protection Clause and required an "exceedingly
persuasive justification" in order to be within constitutional
limits.22 Thus, the Court decided that gender-based discrimina-
tion in the jury selection process could only be justified by show-
ing that it substantially furthered the State's legitimate interest
in a fair and impartial trial.2" The Court's evaluation of the
merits of gender-based challenges weighed the likelihood that
such challenges would substantially aid in securing an impartial
jury against the corresponding detrimental effects of gender
discrimination.24
To determine whether the dangers posed by such discrimina-
tion outweighed the possible benefits, the Court applied the
rationale used in Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co. 5 and em-
phasized the potential harms that could result from discrimina-
tion in the jury process.26 The majority opinion examined the
dangers of such discrimination as they applied to the litigants,
20. Id. at 1425.
21. Id. at 1423-24. In fact, the Court found that there had been a longer his-
tory of discriminatory practices toward women than toward racial minorities in the
jury selection process. Id. at 1425.
22. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1425. The Court discussed the varying levels of scru-
tiny under the Equal Protection Clause and the treatment accorded to gender-based
classifications. Id. (citing City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S.
432, 441 (1985) and Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724
(1982)).
23. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1425. The Court noted that it was limiting its consid-
eration of the matter to those peremptory challenges based on gender stereotypes
only, and not the value of peremptory challenges as a whole, in determining if they
were necessary to ensure a fair trial. Id. To this end, the State argued that in light
of the perceived sympathies of men and women, gender-based challenges were neces-
sary to obtain an impartial jury. Id. at 1426. While the Court recognized that it
might be possible to find some statistical support for the proposition that male and
female jurors were likely to favor a particular party in certain types of cases, the
Court refused to accept such an argument because it rested on the very stereotypes
that the Court sought to eliminate. Id. at 1427 n.11.
24. Id. at 1426-27.
25. 500 U.S. 614 (1991).
26. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1427. In holding that a private litigant in a civil case
was a state actor for purposes of peremptory challenges, and therefore could not dis-
criminate based on race, the Court in Edmonson expressed concern that any discrim-
ination in a trial process sanctioned by a state would raise serious questions about
the fairness of the entire process. See Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 628.
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the community, and the individual jurors. 7 Additionally, the
Court noted that this type of discrimination denied citizens their
right to participate directly in the democratic process and ren-
dered the resultant jury unrepresentative of the community at
large.2" The Court concluded that, in light of these concerns,
the State's legitimate interest in achieving a fair trial was not
strong enough to condone gender discrimination in the use of
peremptory challenges. '
The Court distinguished peremptory challenges based upon a
person's race or sex from those challenges based on other char-
acteristics, such as occupation, by determining that the latter
did not promote unjust, historical stereotypes relating to a
group's competence and inclinations." The Court then acknowl-
edged the beneficial nature of the peremptory challenge in se-
lecting a fair and impartial jury and asserted that its holding
did not signify the demise of all peremptory challenges.' Final-
ly, the Court adopted the guidelines set out in Batson for chal-
lenging an allegedly discriminatory use of a peremptory
strike." If the State had to justify its actions, the reasons given
had to be more than a mere guise, but they did not have to at-
tain the level of justification required to sustain a challenge for
cause.3" The Court reversed the decision of the Alabama Court
of Civil Appeals and remanded the case. 4
In a concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor agreed that gender-
based peremptory challenges were unconstitutional, but not
when exercised by civil litigants or criminal defendants.35 She
argued that while the government was a state actor, and there-
27. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1427. The possible harm to the litigants stemmed
from the risk that the prejudice involved in the jury selection process would extend
to the rest of the proceedings. Id. The danger to the community was the willing
participation by the State in a discriminatory act. Id. The jeopardy to the individual
resulted from the stigma attached to the rejected jurors that they were somehow
incapable of deciding the case on the merits simply because of their sex. Id. at 1428.
28. Id. at 1430.
29. Id. The Court asserted that the limitation did not prevent parties from re-
moving those jurors who they believed would be less receptive to their case; it only
eliminated gender as a basis for that belief. Id. at 1429.
30. Id. at 1429 n.14.
31. Id. at 1429.
32. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1429-30. The court noted that the party challenging
the strike had to make a prima facie showing of intentional discrimination before
the proponent of the strike would be required to justify it. Batson, 476 U.S. at 97.
33. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1430. The Court asserted that any gender-neutral,
non-pretextual, explanation would suffice, even if it disproportionately affected one
gender. Id. at 1429.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 1432 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Vol. 33:10331036
Recent Decisions
fore was bound by the Equal Protection Clause, civil litigants
and criminal defendants were not. 8 She contended that while
the gender of the juror made no difference as a matter of law,
the practical reality was that gender could make a difference as
a matter of fact.37 In light of this distinction, the rights of the
jurors should not be elevated over the rights of the defendant or
the litigants, because .the jurors were only incidentally affected
by outcome of the case, whereas the defendant or the litigants
were directly affected.'
In another concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy explained his
position that the J.E.B. holding was in accord with established
precedents and was mandated by the commands of the Equal
Protection Clause. 9 He observed that although the Fourteenth
Amendment might originally have been designed and adopted to
prevent racial discrimination, recent decisions have erased any
doubt that it applied with equal force to sexual discrimina-
tion.' Furthermore, because the Equal Protection Clause fo-
cused on the rights of individuals, a person who was denied jury
service, through the use of a peremptory challenge, solely be-
cause of their sex, suffered the same injury as one who was
excluded from jury service by law." Therefore, Justice Kennedy
concluded that the individual nature of the guarantees under
the Equal Protection Clause required the prohibition of gender-
based peremptory challenges.42 He also commented that it was
incumbent upon seated jurors to uphold equal protection princi-
ples and avoid tainting their decisions with any racial or sexual
bias of their own, so as to protect the individual rights of the
defendant in the same manner as Batson and J.E.B. protected
the juror's rights.
In a dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist asserted that
36. Id. Justice O'Connor reiterated her belief that Edmonson and McCollum,
which treated civil litigants and criminal defendants as state actors, were wrongly
decided. Id.
37. Id.
38. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1432-33 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
39. id. at 1433-34 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
40. Id. at 1433. Justice Kennedy observed that while some of the original
drafts of the amendment only prohibited discrimination on account of race or previ-
ous condition of servitude, the language of the final version granted equal protection
to "any person." Id. And, although it took a long time, recent case law clearly indi-
cated that gender classifications were presumptively invalid. Id. (citing Mississippi
Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982)).
41. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1434 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
42. Id.
43. Id. Justice Kennedy also stated that, "the Constitution guarantees a right




Batson was distinguishable from J.E.B. based on acknowledged
differences between racial discrimination and gender discrimina-
tion." His dissent contended that racial groups required a
greater amount of protection because they were a numerical
minority in society and have been subjected to more intense and
determined efforts at discrimination than other groups.45
Rehnquist further argued that the holding in Batson should be
interpreted as an affirmation that the primary purpose of the
Fourteenth Amendment was to eliminate racial injustice." Fi-
nally, the dissent declared that the State had met its burden of
proving that gender-based strikes substantially furthered the
State's interest in achieving a fair trial because the biological
and practical differences between the sexes could result in di-
verging viewpoints which could yield varying results in a court-
room.
4 7
In another dissenting opinion, Justice Scalia, joined by Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas, argued that the
majority's long, detailed history of discrimination against women
in the jury selection process was not on point because the al-
leged discrimination in this case was directed at men." More-
over, the dissent argued that historically, women were excluded
from juries because it was thought that they were incompetent;
but the reason for removing women, as well as any other poten-
tial juror, from the venire49 was because of doubt that they
would favor the striking party's case." Therefore, the majority's
reliance on the historical exclusion of women from juries was
inapplicable to the present case, involving removal from the
venire, because the reasons underlying the two actions were not
analogous.5 The dissent also contended that if there indeed
44. Id. at 1434-35 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). The difference was evidenced
by the status the Court accorded to both groups under the Equal Protection Clause.
Id. Racial classifications warranted "strict" scrutiny but gender classifications only
merited "heightened" scrutiny. Id.; see, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976)
(holding that gender classifications had to be substantially related to an important
state interest to be justified); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944)
(determining that racial classifications were immediately suspect and could only be
justified by a compelling state interest).
45. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1435 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 1436 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
49. Venire is defined as the group of citizens from whom a jury is chosen in a
given case. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1556 (6th ed. 1990).
50. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1437 (Scalia, J., dissenting). It was also Justice
Scalia's contention that because every group imaginable was susceptible to being




had been an injury due to sex discrimination, it was suffered by
the stricken juror and not the petitioner.52 Finally, the dissent
asserted that because all peremptory challenges were based on
some type of group characteristic, they could all be classified as
stereotyping. 3 However, Justice Scalia contended that the
majority's logic implied that any strike based upon a group ste-
reotype could never rationally further a legitimate government
interest, thus placing all peremptory strikes in jeopardy because
they could not pass the rational basis test, much less any form
of heightened scrutiny.5 ' Therefore, he argued that the majority
was creating a double standard; it arbitrarily deemed certain
kinds of stereotypes, those based on race and gender, impermis-
sible, while others, such as those based on occupation and hair
color, apparently acceptable, despite the fact that none furthered
a legitimate state interest.5 Justice Scalia opined that the pe-
remptory challenge was a vital part of the adversarial nature of
the jury trial; placing restrictions on its use would not only bur-
den the court system in a practical manner, but would also com-
promise the fair trial process of the judicial system as a
whole.5"
For over sixty years, the Supreme Court has maintained that
a jury should be representative of the community. 7 Neverthe-
less, discrimination in the jury process has been an enduring
plague upon the justice system." Prior to the enactment of the
Fourteenth Amendment, state law generally restricted jury
service to white males.5" However, the Equal Protection Clause
prompted the Court to take the first steps toward the elimina-
tion of discriminatory practices in jury selection in Strauder v.
West Virginia.'
In Strauder, an African-American defendant was convicted of
52. Id. Moreover, the dissent contended that even if there was some remote
injury to the petitioner, the error was harmless because the scientific evidence at
trial established his paternity with 99.92% accuracy. Id.
53. Id. at 1438.
54. Id. Justice Scalia interpreted the Court's statement that it would not ac-
cept any argument "based on the very stereotype the law condemns" as rejecting all
arguments offered to show that the government's only legitimate interest, obtaining
a fair trial, could be rationally furthered by eliminating potential jurors based on
any group characteristics. Id.
55. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1438 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
56. Id. at 1439.
57. See Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130 (1940) (reversing the conviction of
an African-American defendant because of the systematic exclusion of African-Ameri-
cans from the venire).
58. See, e.g., Batson, 476 U.S. at 88-89.
59. See, e.g., J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1422-23.
60. 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
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murder in a jury trial."' The Court considered whether a state
law that excluded African-American men from the venire was a
violation of the defendant's equal protection rights.'m In consid-
ering this question, the Court did not examine whether the de-
fendant had a right to a jury composed of men of like race, but
whether he had a right to have men of his race included in the
pool of potential jurors.' The Court observed that while the
law guaranteed that a white man would have a jury selected
from persons of his own race, it expressly denied the same right
to an African-American man, resulting in unequal treatment
under the law.' 4 Thus, the Court held that the exclusion of Af-
rican-American men from the venire constituted a denial of
equal protection under the laws to an African-American defen-
dant."6 However, the Court asserted that the state had the
right to exclude women and other persons it deemed not quali-
fied for jury service.'
The issue of unconstitutional jury selection processes was
revisited by the Court in Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co.67 In
Thiel, the petitioner brought a claim of negligence against the
defendant railroad company." On appeal, the sole question the
Court considered was whether the lower court had improperly
denied the petitioner's motion to strike the entire jury." After a
review of the procedures used to select the jury pool, the Court
found that day laborers had been purposefully and systematical-
61. Strauder, 100 U.S. at 304.
62. Id. The West Virginia statute provided that "[aill white male persons who
are twenty one years of age and who are citizens of this State shall be liable to
serve as jurors, except as herein provided." Law of March 12, 1872-73 W. Va. Acts,
102 (repealed 1880).
63. Strauder, 100 U.S. at 305.
64. Id. at 309. The Court further noted that this type of exclusion perpetuated
the notion that African-American men were inferior to white men and stimulated the
racial prejudice that the Equal Protection Clause sought to eliminate. Id. at 308.
65. Id. at 310.
66. Id. The Court opined that the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was
to prevent discrimination based on race and suggested that extending it to other
forms of discrimination would require a showing of substantial need. Id.
67. 328 U.S. 217 (1946).
68. Thiel, 328 U.S. at 219. The petitioner jumped from a moving train. Id. at
218-19. He alleged that the defendant was negligent in allowing him to jump be-
cause the defendant knew the petitioner was not of sound mind and should not have
permitted him to board the train or else should have guarded him while he was on
the train. Id. at 219. Pursuant to the petitioner's demand, a jury taal was held
which found for the defendant. Id.
69. Id. at 220. The basis of the motion was that the jury panel was composed
of business executives and employers and was devoid of working class men, thus dis-




ly excluded. 7s The Court determined that this type of economic
exclusion was not sanctioned by any state or federal law and
could not be tolerated.7 The Court emphasized the individual
nature of jury service and how one's competence to serve was
not based upon any group or class characteristics.7 2 The Court
concluded that to allow such discrimination would undermine
the very principles upon which a trial by jury was based.73
It was not until Swain v. Alabama74 that the Court consid-
ered discrimination in conjunction with the peremptory chal-
lenge. In Swain, the state used peremptory challenges to remove
all African-American members of the venire. 5 The petitioner
claimed that this was a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause.7" The Court noted that the primary purpose of such a
challenge was to enable both parties to preclude potential jurors
suspected of harboring biased opinions from deciding the case.7"
The Court opined that the foundations for these suspicions were
often inarticulable and could be grounded in intuition or preju-
dices that would normally be inappropriate in a legal proceed-
70. Id. at 221. The evidence revealed that the jury commissioner intentionally
excluded from the jury lists all persons whose occupation indicated that they worked
for a daily wage. Id. The commissioner had found by experience that day laborers
would not sacrifice their wages to serve as a juror. Id. at 222.
71. Id. at 222-24. In light of the unconstitutional nature of the jury selection
process, the Court did not consider whether the petitioner had suffered any injury
as a result of the wrongful exclusions. Id. at 225.
72. Id. at 220.
73. Thiel, 328 U.S. at 220. According to the Court, the sanctioning of such dis-
criminatory practices would work to establish the jury as an instrument of the so-
cially and economically privileged, and would render meaningless the idea of a jury
of one's peers. Id. at 223-24.
74. 380 U.S. 202 (1965), overruled by Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
75. Swain, 380 U.S. at 209-10. Of the eight African-Americans on the venire,
two were exempt and the remaining six were removed through the state's peremp-
tory challenges. Id. at 205.
76. Id. at 203. The petitioner claimed that the state intentionally discriminat-
ed against African-Americans by excluding them from the venire or by assuring that
the number of African-Americans on the venire would be small enough so that they
could all be removed by peremptory challenges. Id. at 210 n.6. On the first claim,
the Court held that the state was not excluding African-Americans from the venire.
Id. at 205-06."
While considering the petitioner's claim, the Court delved into the long histo-
ry of the peremptory challenge, tracing its roots back to English common law felo-
nies. Id. at 212-13. The Court found that the challenge originated with the Ordi-
nance for Inquests which provided that if "they that sue for the King will challenge
any . . . Jurors, they shall assign . . . a Cause certain." Id. at 213 (citing 33 Edw.
1, Stat. 4 (1305)). From its common law origins, the peremptory challenge was pro-
vided for ih the federal system by Congress as early as 1790 and has since been
adopted by all the states statutorily. Swain, 380 U.S. at 213-17. Originally only ap-
plicable in felony cases, the use of peremptory challenges has been expanded to
include all criminal cases as well as civil cases. Id.
77. Swain, 380 U.S. at 219.
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ing." While recognizing that neither party possessed a consti-
tutional right to a peremptory challenge, the Court admitted
that the challenge had become an indispensable part of the right
to a trial by jury.7" Accordingly, the Court held that the elimi-
nation of African-Americans from a jury in any singular case,
through the use of peremptory challenges, was not a denial of
equal protection.80 The Court concluded that any other holding
would significantly alter the characteristics of such a challenge,
depriving it of its usefulness.8'
In Taylor v. Louisiana,8 2 the Court abolished gender discrim-
ination in the creation of the venire by holding that women
could not be excluded or automatically exempted from the venire
on the basis of their sex. 3 The male petitioner in Taylor was
convicted by a jury selected from an all-male group of prospec-
tive jurors.' 4 The petitioner objected to this, based upon his
Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury.8" The issue the Court
addressed was whether the Louisiana Constitution, which con-
tained an automatic exemption for women unless they indicated,
in writing, their willingness to serve as a juror, was unconstitu-
tional.8 6 In order to achieve the Sixth Amendment goal that a
78. Id. at 220.
79. Id. at 219 (citing Stilson v. United States, 250 U.S. 583, 586 (1919) and
Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 376 (1892)).
80. Swain, 380 U.S. at 221. The Court asserted that if a prosecutor consistent-
ly and systematically removed qualified African-American jurors from the venire over
a period of time, by way of peremptory challenges, such that no African-American
ever served on a jury, that could amount to a denial of equal protection. Id. at 223.
However, in the case at hand, although no African-American had served on a jury in
that county for fifteen years, the petitioner had failed to provide any evidence that
the prosecutor's underlying motive during that time was solely to prevent African-
Americans from serving on a jury. Id. at 225-26.
81. Id. at 220-22. The Court observed that the essential nature of the peremp-
tory challenge was that it could be exercised for any reason, including reasons con-
sidered irrelevant to a legal proceeding. Id. at 220. If it were subject to the restric-
tions of the Equal Protection Clause, every challenge made by the prosecutor would
be open to an examination of its underlying motives. Id. at 222. The end result,
according to the Court, would be a ban on many of the challenge's uses. Id.
82. 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
83. Taylor, 419 U.S. at 537.
84. Id. at 524.
85. Id. The Sixth Amendment provides that, "liln all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of
the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed." U.S. CONST.
amend. VI. The Court noted that the Sixth Amendment was applied to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment. Taylor, 419 U.S. at 526. The petitioner's motion
was denied by the lower court. Id. at 525.
86. Id. at 524. The Louisiana Constitution provided that:
The Legislature shall provide for the election and drawing of competent and
intelligent jurors for the trial of civil and criminal cases; provided however,
that no woman shall be drawn for jury service unless she shall have previous-
1042
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jury should be drawn from a venire representative of the com-
munity, the Court deemed it essential that women be included
in the selection process.87 The Court rejected the argument that
women had a distinctive place in society which would be compro-
mised by jury service. Rather, in light of the expanding role of
women in society, the Court held that a fair cross-section of the
community could no longer be achieved without the inclusion of
women.
8 9
Having established the constitutional parameters regarding
eligibility for jury service, the Court was faced with the issue of
whether to expand those limits in Batson v. Kentucky.'0 The
petitioner in Batson was an African-American defendant in a
criminal case.9' During jury selection, the prosecution used its
peremptory challenges to strike the four African-American mem-
bers of the venire, and the petitioner moved to discharge the
jury.
92
The Court found that the same principles relied on to prevent
discrimination during the formation of the venire also applied to
the state's use of peremptory challenges when selecting the
jury." Accordingly, the Court held that the Equal Protection
Clause prohibited the state from exercising peremptory challeng-
ly filed with the clerk of the District Court a written declaration of her desire
to be subject to such service.
LA. CONST. art. VII, § 41 (amended 1975).
87. Taylor, 419 U.S. at 534-35. The Court had previously declared that women
could not be excluded from venires in federal trials within those states that allowed
women to be members of the jury pool. See Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187,
193 (1946). However, the Court later held that it was still permissible to exempt
women from jury service by statute, requiring them to volunteer if they wanted to
serve. See Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 64 (1961), overruled by Taylor v. Louisiana,
419 U.S. 522 (1975).
88. Taylor, 419 U.S. at 534-35. Citing statistics regarding the number of wom-
en in the workforce, the Court found that the traditional notion of a woman's role
was no longer viable. Id. at 535 n.17. Moreover, although it might be burdensome
for some women to serve on juries, they could be exempted from jury service in the
same manner as men who could not serve due to some special hardship. Id. at 535.
The inconvenience of administering these additional exemptions could not justify the
potential exclusion of all women from jury service. Id.
89. Id. at 531.
90. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
91. Batson, 476 U.S. at 82. The petitioner, an African-American man, was
charged with burglary and receiving stolen property. Id.
92. Id. at 83. The petitioner's motion was based upon his constitutional rights
to a trial by a jury and equal protection under the laws. Id. Relying on Swain, the
lower court denied the petitioner's motion and the jury subsequently convicted him.
Id. On appeal, the petitioner argued that the Kentucky Supreme Court should have
followed the decisions of two other states which had found this practice to be uncon-
stitutional tnder the Sixth Amendment. Id.
93. Id. at 85-88.
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es that were based solely on race.94 In overruling Swain, the
Court found that the Swain test was unworkable, overly burden-
some, and inconsistent with more recent decisions concerning
the requisite proof to establish racial discrimination in the cre-
ation of the venire." The Court concluded that a violation of
the Equal Protection Clause could be found from the facts of a
single case and that it was not necessary to show a pattern of
racial discrimination by the state.
The Court then outlined the necessary elements for a prima
facie case of intentional discrimination by a state in its use of
peremptory challenges. 7 First, the defendant had to show that
he was a member of a cognizable racial group, and that the
State had used its challenges to remove other members of his
racial group from the venire.9s The defendant was then entitled
to use this and other relevant evidence to raise an inference of
intentional discrimination." Once the presumption was raised,
the burden shifted to the state to provide a racially neutral
explanation for its actions, but such an explanation did not have
to meet the requirements of a challenge for cause."0 Despite
this limitation on their use, the Court reaffirmed its position
that peremptory strikes still played a vital role in obtaining a
fair trial and were an important part of the legal process.''
94. Id. at 89. The Court declined to express any opinion as to whether this
constitutional limit was similarly imposed on peremptory challenges initiated by the
defendant. Id. at 89 n.12.
95. Id. at 93-95. A prima facie case of discrimination in selecting the
defendant's venire could be established when the defendant showed he was a mem-
ber of a racial group singled out for differential treatment and that members of the
defendant's race were substantially underrepresented on the particular venire from
which his jury was selected, providing an opportunity for discrimination. Id. at 95
(citing Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545 (1967)). Once a prima facie case was estab-
lished, the burden shifted to the State to provide racially neutral grounds, in the
form of selection criteria and procedures, as opposed to mere assertions, for the ex-
clusion of members of a certain race from the venire. Batson, 476 U.S. at 94 (citing
Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625 (1972)).
96. Batson, 476 U.S. at 95. The Court asserted that this conclusion was con-
sistent with other recent cases interpreting the Equal Protection Clause. Id. (citing
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977)).
97. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 96-97.
100. Id. at 97. The Court remanded the case to the lower court with instruc-
tions to apply this test and reverse the petitioner's conviction if the state had en-
gaged in deliberate discrimination. Id. at 100.
101. Id. at 98-99. Shortly after the Batson decision, the Court denied certiorari
in the case of Brown v. North Carolina. See Brown v. North Carolina, 479 U.S. 940
(1986). In doing so, the Court declined to extend the Batson holding beyond the
sphere of race-based challenges. Brown, 479 U.S. at 941 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
In Brown, the petitioner claimed that peremptory challenges based upon the prospec-
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The Court extended Batson in Powers v. Ohio.' The peti-
tioner in Powers, a white man, objected to the state's use of
peremptory challenges to remove African-American members of
the venire.' The Court considered whether the petitioner's
status as a member of a race other than that of the excluded
persons prevented him from raising a claim under Batson.' 4
The Court concluded that it did not, and held that a criminal
defendant had the standing to raise objections to those peremp-
tory challenges exercised by the prosecutor which were based
solely on race, regardless of whether the defendant and the
excluded jurors were of the same race."'
The Court focused on the injury to the potential juror, as well
as to the community as a whole, that resulted from this type of
discriminatory conduct."e The Court determined that a defen-
dant in a criminal case had sufficient standing to raise the equal
protection claims of the potential jurors who were unconstitu-
tionally excluded from jury service because of their race. 07 The
Court noted that racially discriminatory practices within the
judicial process threatened its integrity, and that both the crimi-
nal defendant and the potential juror had a viable interest in
eliminating such practices.' °s The Court concluded, however,
that because the defendant's motivation to ensure fairness in the
tive juror's views on capital punishment also fell within the purview of the Equal
Protection Clause. Id. at 943 (Brennan, J., dissenting). In her concurrence, Justice
O'Connor stated that, as a matter of law, a juror's race was irrelevant to their judg-
ment of the case but a juror's views on capital punishment were not. Id. at 942
(O'Connor, J., concurring). Furthermore, the Court's denial of certiorari, as explained
by Justice O'Connor, implied that Batson was strictly limited to those challenges
motivated solely by the prospective juror's race. Id. at 941.
102. 499 U.S. 400 (1991).
103. Powers, 499 U.S. at 402-03. The petitioner's claims were based on both
Sixth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment principles. Id. However, the Court
found that the Sixth Amendment did not'place any restrictions on the selection of
jurors through peremptory strikes, and limited its analysis to the petitioner's claim
under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 403-04 (citing Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S.
474 (1990)).
104. Powers, 499 U.S. at 403.
105. Id. at 402.
106. Id. at 406-10. The Court rejected the state's argument that a defendant's
standing to present a claim under Batson was conditional upon his identity with the
excluded juror as members of the same -,race. Id. at 406. Such a construction was
not in accord with accepted principles relating to a person's ability to raise constitu-
tional claims or with the guarantees of the Equal Protection Clause. Id.
107. Id. at 410-15. The Court identified three elements that had to be present
to enable a litigant to bring a claim on behalf of a third party. Id. at 411. There
had to be an "injury in fact" to the litigant, there had to be a close relationship
between the litigant and the third party, and there must be an impediment to the
third party's ability to bring the claim. Id.
108. Id. at 411-14.
Duquesne Law Review Vol. 33:1033
proceedings far outweighed that of the dismissed jurors, the
interests of justice could best be served by allowing the defen-
dant to raise the equal protection claim. '
Another extension of the Batson ruling occurred in Edmonson
v. Leesville Concrete Co., Inc."' The petitioner in Edmonson
was involved in a negligence action against the respondent cor-
poration."' When the respondent used two of its three peremp-
tory challenges to remove African-American members from the
venire, the petitioner requested a race-neutral explanation for
this action."' Asserting that Batson did not apply to civil pio-
ceedings, the trial court denied the request."'
The issue considered by the Court was whether Batson ap-
plied to civil proceedings in which the state was not a party.1
4
The Court noted that the injury to the excluded juror and the
apparent sanctioning of discrimination by the state within its
own court system were essentially the same in civil cases as in
criminal cases."' The Court held that civil litigants were state
actors when exercising peremptory challenges." ' The Court
used a two-step analysis to reach its conclusion. First, the Court
found that the alleged deprivation of the asserted constitutional
right was the result of a privilege derived from state authority,
namely, the statutory provision for peremptory challenges.""
109. Powers, 499 U.S. at 414-15.
110. 500 U.S. 614 (1991).
111. Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 616. The petitioner, an African-American man, was
a construction worker who was injured when one of the defendant's trucks rolled
backwards and pinned him against some other construction equipment. Id.
112. Id. at 617.
113. Id. The jury rendered a verdict for the petitioner, but also found his con-
tributory negligence to be 80%, and awarded him only 20% of the total damages. Id.
A divided panel of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, and held that Batson
applied to civil litigants. Id. (citing Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 860 F.2d
1308 (5th Cir. 1989), rev'd, 895 F.2d 218 (5th Cir. 1990)). The full court then or-
dered a rehearing en banc and affirmed the district court, holding that peremptory
challenges exercised by civil litigants were not subject to review. Edmonson, 500
U.S. at 617 (citing Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 895 F.2d 218 (5th Cir. 1990)
(en banc)).
114. Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 628. Because this case was brought in a federal
court, the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause
was applied. Id. (citing Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954)).
115. Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 628.
116. Id. In reaching this conclusion, the Court referred to its decision in Pow-
ers, regarding the ability of a third party to bring an action, and its holding in
Thiel, which involved a civil proceeding. Id. at 618-19.
117. Id. The Court noted that peremptory challenges existed only by statute or
case law and served no purpose outside the courtroom. Id. Without such state au-
thority, it would not have been possible for the respondent to have conducted its
actions in an allegedly discriminatory manner. Id. at 621. The authorizing statute
provided "[iln civil cases, each party shall be entitled to three peremptory challenges.
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Second, the Court determined that it was not unfair to catego-
rize the private party accused of the constitutionally impermissi-
ble action as a state actor."' In addition, the Court reasoned
that civil actions furthered the state's interest in punishing and
deterring wrongful actions."9 The Court concluded that allow-
ing such constitutionally abhorrent conduct to arise in a process
so intertwined with governmental authority would create the
unacceptable impression that the state endorsed such con-
duct.12
In 1992, in Georgia v. McCollum,"' the Court further ex-
panded the Batson doctrine when it held that defendants in
criminal cases were also prohibited from exercising peremptory
challenges in a racially discriminatory manner. 22  In
McCollum, the white defendants were charged with battery and
simple assault against two African-Americans."' The Court
considered whether a criminal defendant could be required to
tender a racially neutral explanation for his peremptory chal-
lenges when the state succeeded in establishing a prima facie
showing of discrimination as outlined in Batson.'24
The majority identified four factors that were dispositive of
the issue of whether a defendant's peremptory challenges could
be restricted by the Equal Protection Clause. 5 First, the
Several defendants or several plaintiffs may be considered as a single party for the
purposes of making challenges, or the court may allow additional challenges and
permit them to be exercised separately or jointly." 28 U.S.C. § 1870 (1988).
118. Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 622. To determine if the nature of the relevant ac-
tion was governmental, thus enabling the person performing the action to qualify as
a state actor, the Court considered three factors. Id. at 621-22. These included the
extent to which the actor relied on government assistance, whether the actor was
performing a traditional government function, and the aggravating effects of govern-
mental authority on the resulting injury. Id.
119. Id. at 625.
120. Id. at 627-30. Under the Court's analysis, because it would be impossible
for any party to exercise peremptory strikes without prior affirmative action by the
government, evidenced by the summoning of the jury and the procedures required to
discharge a juror, it was impractical to separate the state's actions from the
litigants' actions. Id. at 624.
121. 112 S. Ct. 2348 (1992).
122. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2359.
123. Id. at 2351.
124. Id. Asserting that the defendants had announced their intent to remove
African-Americans from the venire with peremptory strikes, the state moved for an
order that would have required the defendants to explain their strikes once the state
made a prima facie showing of discrimination. Id. The order was denied, and the
issue was certified for immediate appeal. Id. The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed
the trial court's ruling, holding that peremptory challenges were an essential part of
the defendant's right to trial by jury and should not be diminished. Id. (citing State
v. McCollum, 405 S.E.2d 688, 689 (Ga. 1991), rev'd, 112 S. Ct 2348 (1992)).
125. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2353.
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Court determined that regardless of whether the discriminatory
conduct was pursued by the state or by the defendant, the resul-
tant harms were the same.26 Next, the Court decided that the
defendant's use of peremptory challenges qualified as a state
action, thus subjecting such conduct to the restrictions imposed
by the Equal Protection Clause.12v The third determination
made by the Court was that the state had sufficient standing to
question the defendant's action.'28 Finally, the Court concluded
that the rights of the defendant did not supersede the constitu-
tional interests protected by the Batson doctrine.' Thus, the
Court found that while the Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial
guaranteed the defendant an impartial jury free of racial preju-
dice, it did not recognize the viability of such prejudices as a
legitimate means to achieve this end.3
The subsequent holding in J.E.B. v. Alabama that eliminated
gender-based peremptory challenges was the culmination of a
long and arduous process begun by the Supreme Court over one-
hundred years ago in Strauder v. West Virginia. Beginning with
Strauder, the Court slowly and cautiously embarked on a path
toward eliminating discriminatory practices in jury selection. In
Strauder, the Court took the initial step on this pilgrimage when
it prohibited the exclusion of African-Americans from the veni-
re.'31 Many years later, the Court in Taylor officially extended
the guarantees of the Equal Protection Clause to women, as far
as the venire selection process was concerned. 2
126. Id. at 2354. The Court found that the overwhelming need for integrity
within the judicial system did not allow for discrimination by any party. Id. at 2353-
54. In addition, there were no distinguishing characteristics between the discrimina-
tion suffered by the potential jurors when they were excluded by the state or by the
defendant. Id.
127. Id. at 2356. Applying the same rationale used in Edmonson, the Court
found that the defendant in a criminal case relied on the same governmental assis-
tance and functions as a private litigant in a civil case. Id. at 2354-56. The Court
rejected the contention that the adversarial nature of a criminal proceeding preclud-
ed a defendant from being categorized as a state actor. Id. at 2356. However, de-
pending upon the nature and context of the action taken, the defendant could not
always be a state actor for any given function. Id.
128. Id. at 2357. The Court relied directly on its analysis in Powers to arrive
at this conclusion. Id. See notes 102-09 and accompanying text for a complete dis-
cussion of Powers.
129. Id. at 2358. Initially, the Court noted that peremptory challenges were not
a constitutional right, but merely a state created privilege. Id. The usefulness of the
peremptory challenge could not be significantly curtailed by this limitation. Id. More-
over, any detrimental effects that accrued were justified as the necessary price for
the abrogation of racial discrimination in the legal process. Id. at 2358-59.
130. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2359.
131. Strauder, 100 U.S. at 310.
132. See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 537 (1975).
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Although the Court was more reluctant to place limits on
discriminatory uses of peremptory challenges, its eventual deci-
sions in this area paralleled those made with regard to the selec-
tion of the venire.'3 3 Initially, tlhe Court resisted attempts to
restrict peremptory challenges by imposing a very heavy burden
on the defendant to prove his case. In Swain, the Court set as a
threshold requirement the total exclusion of African-Americans
from all juries in a given area over a period of time as the test
for racial discrimination in the selection of a jury from the veni-
re.3 However, the Court eventually overruled Swain, holding
in Batson that race-based peremptory challenges by the state in
criminal cases were unconstitutional in every instance.'35 From
there, the Court gradually expanded this doctrine to include
race-based challenges exercised by the defendant in a criminal
case or by any of the litigants in a civil case, even if the party
seeking to enforce the doctrine was not a member of the race
that was excluded.
136
When the J.E.B. case arose, all of the essential elements were
in place to broaden the Batson doctrine and prohibit gender-
based peremptory challenges, in addition to race-based challeng-
es, just as the Court had done earlier when dealing with dis-
crimination in the selection of the venire. In J.E.B., the
majority's long discourse of the historical exclusion of women
and African-Americans from jury service emphasized the Court's
opinion that there was very little difference between the causes
and effects of race-based exclusions and gender-based exclu-
sions.'3 7 Thus, the Court naturally seized the opportunity to
terminate the practice of gender discrimination within the jury
system, just as it had done with racial discrimination.
Despite its recent decisions restricting peremptory challenges,
the use of peremptory challenges as a tool for assuring a fair
133. See, e.g., Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 223 (1965), overruled by Batson
v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986); Batson, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986).
134. Swain, 380 U.S. at 223. The required showing of proof to establish an
equal protection claim with regard to peremptory challenges, as defined in Swain,
was exceedingly difficult to attain. Dave Harbeck, Eliminating Unconstitutional Ju-
ries: Applying United States v. DeGross to all Heightened Scrutiny Equal Protection
Groups in the Exercise of Peremptory Challenges, 77 MINN. L. REV. 689, 696 n.48
(1993). In the twenty years during which the Swain test was followed, only two
defendants succeeded in meeting its requirements. Id. (citing Marvin B. Steinberg,
The Case for Eliminating Peremptory Challenges, 27 CRIM. L. BULL., May-June 1991,
at 216, 221).
135. Batson, 476 U.S. at 89.
136. See McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2361; Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 628; Powers,
499 U.S. at 402.
137. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1423-25.
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trial has consistently been defended by the Court.3 In J.E.B.,
the majority opinion reaffirmed the importance of the perempto-
ry challenge and asserted its continuing viability as a method
for ensuring a fair trial.'39 Given the Court's strong support of
peremptory challenges, it is unlikely that they are in immediate
danger of being eliminated altogether.14 However, the nature
of the J.E.B. opinion, relying as it did on a heightened scrutiny
analysis, seemed to indicate that additional limitations could be
imposed on the use of peremptory challenges. As noted by the
Court in J.E.B., the issue considered was whether the discrimi-
natory conduct by the state actor could be justified as being
substantially related to the state's interest in obtaining a fair
trial.' This is the general test applied to all groups that merit
heightened scrutiny when raising a claim under the Equal Pro-
tection Clause.' Aside from classifications based on gender,
additional groups justifying heightened scrutiny under the Equal
Protection Clause include classifications based on national origin
and religious affiliation.' Thus, in addition to a gender-based
challenge, under the analysis employed by the Court in J.E.B.,
any challenge based upon one of these group characteristics
would likewise be unconstitutional.
It is unlikely that the Court is ready to go beyond these spe-
cial groups though when considering the validity of a perempto-
ry challenge based upon a class trait. One indication of this was
the Court's denial of certiorari in Brown v. North Carolina,
where the Petitioner's claim was based upon the exclusion of
potential jurors who were against capital punishment, and thus
were not members of a cognizable group for purposes of the
Equal Protection Clause.'44 Moreover, the majority in J.E.B.
goes so far as to distinguish challenges based on group charac-
teristics, such as race and gender, from those based on other
qualities of a prospective juror, such as occupation, stating that
138. See, e.g., Batson, 476 U.S. at 98-99; Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 630;
McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2360.
139. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1429.
140. Although in McCollum, the Court did note that its position on peremptory
challenges had long been that they could be eliminated without offending the con-
stitutional rights of a party to an impartial jury and a fair trial. See McCollum, 112
S. Ct. at 2359.
141. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1425.
142. Harbeck, cited at note 134, at 694.
143. Id. Whether a certain group is subject to heightened scrutiny is deter-
mined by analyzing the historical discriminatory treatment of that group, whether
the group has immutable traits, and whether the group has been without political
power. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 438 (1985).
144. Brown, 479 U.S. at 943 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Vol. 33:10331050
Recent Decisions
the latter are acceptable because they do not promulgate injuri-
ous stereotypes relating to the capabilities of the entire
group..
145
Although the majority in J.E.B. did not expressly extend its
holding to apply to other heightened scrutiny groups, Justice
Scalia acknowledged in his dissent that this would be the practi-
cal result.' The same conclusion was also reached by former
Chief Justice Burger in his dissent in Batson, where he stated
that under an Equal Protection analysis, peremptory challenges
based upon the sex or religion of prospective jurors, in addition
to other traits, would be impermissible. "7 The subsequent use
of equal protection principles to decide J.E.B. seemed to validate
Burger's claim. Thus, despite the Court's reluctance to extend
Batson to all heightened scrutiny groups at once, it appears
likely that the Court will place additional restrictions on the use
of peremptory challenges when other cases involving heightened
scrutiny groups arise.
Should the Court decline to do so however, it would be forced
to distinguish both Batson and J.E.B. The most plausible ratio-
nale for severing the ties to other heightened scrutiny groups in
this area would be based upon the historical discrimination
endured by African-Americans and women with regard to jury
selection. Other groups warranting heightened scrutiny were
relatively unaffected by this type of discrimination. Such a re-
sult, while arguably defensible on a superficial level given the
Court's emphasis on the historical roots of jury discrimination in
both Batson and J.E.B., would be inconsistent with the equal
protection analysis in J.E.B.
The same types of harm resulting from race and gender dis-
crimination are also present when discrimination is based upon
any attribute, such as religious preference, that entitles a group
to heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause.'
These harms are not lessened simply because the particular
group at which the discrimination is directed has not been undu-
ly subjected to similar discrimination in the past. Therefore, the
analysis and holding in J.E.B. should eventually assure that all
145. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1428 n.14.
146. Id. at 1438 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
147. Batson, 476 U.S. at 123-24 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
148. Harbeck, cited at note 134, at 711-14. The resultant harm is to the defen-
dant, the excluded juror, and the entire community, insofar as state sanctioned dis-
crimination within the judicial system undermines the system as a whole. Id.
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groups which merit heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protec-
tion Clause will be protected from discrimination in the exercise
of peremptory challenges.
David M. Seitz
